Analyzing Ethnocentric Immigration through the Case of Hungary – Demographic Effects of Immigration from Neighboring Countries to Hungary by Péti, Márton et al.
Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies 
2021, Vol. 8, No. 4, 128-153   
http://dx.doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/857 
                                                           Copyright 2021 
                                                        ISSN: 2149-1291 
 
 128 
Analyzing Ethnocentric Immigration through the Case of Hungary – 
Demographic Effects of Immigration from Neighboring Countries to 
Hungary 
  
Márton Péti1  
Research Institute for National Strategy, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungarian 
 
Laura Szabó and Csilla Obádovics  
Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, Hungarian 
 
Balázs Szabó and Dávid Csécsi 
Research Institute for National Strategy, Hungarian 
 
Abstract: Specific ethnocentric international migration processes 
can be observed in Hungary: a significant proportion of immigrants 
are of Hungarian ethnic background and come from neighboring 
countries. Similar processes can be observed between other kin-
states and co-ethnic communities of Central and Eastern Europe, but 
this type of migration has not been studied intensively yet. The focus 
of the research is on the effects of this immigration on Hungarian 
society and the economy. Population projections were also carried 
out according to two research questions: “what would have 
happened if the immigrants had not arrived according to the 
processes that were experienced?” and “what will happen if the 
immigration process changes?” The research is based on the 2011 
census data sets; the target group is the population born in 
neighboring countries that moved to Hungary after 1985. Results 
show that the ethnic Hungarian immigrant population has been a 
crucial human resource in Hungary. Without these immigrants, 
Hungary's demographic trends would also be less favorable. 
Moreover, in contrast to the situation typical of European 
immigrants, the socio-economic situation of the former is more 
favorable than of the host society. Potential decline of this 
immigration population could indeed be challenging.  
Keywords: ethnocentric migration, migration, Hungary, Central and 
Eastern Europe, demography, population projection 
 
The main characteristics of migration that affect Hungary do not differ significantly 
from international and Central and Eastern European processes. However, a deeper analysis 
shows that, in the last thirty years, the Hungarian situation has had specific features. These 
include the emergence of mass immigration since the late 1980s, which has only recently 
become a significant phenomenon in several states of the region. It is also a peculiar feature 
that a significant proportion of immigrants speak the same language and have the same ethnic 
background as the host population. This ethnocentric type of migration can also be observed in 
some other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, too. Unlike more general 
immigration policies, ethnocentric migration is even encouraged by certain national policies in 
 






CEE. Still, it has been researched to a lesser degree than other migration processes related to 
this macroregion. Examining Hungarian ethnocentric migration may provide lessons for future 
studies and contribute to the better understanding of this phenomenon in CEE or even globally. 
The case of Hungary has both emblematic and distinct features, as ethnic Hungarians 
perhaps comprise the largest native minority population in CEE (or at least one of the largest – 
depending on different regional delineations and different definitions of native minority 
communities). So, the population of Hungary probably relies significantly on immigration 
flows originating from these communities. It is a very sensitive interdependency, as the official 
Hungarian national strategic doctrine since the 1990s has concerned the need to sustain native 
ethnic Hungarian minority communities, rather than encouraging their immigration to Hungary 
(unlike, for instance, with Germans to Germany since the 1980s).  
The geographical pattern of ethnocentric international migration in Hungary is similar 
to that of internal migration processes: from peripheral areas located mostly along the borders 
of the country towards central and western urban centers (Gödri, 2010). Communities of ethnic 
Hungarians as sources of Hungarian immigration are mainly located close to the Hungarian 
border in almost all locations around Hungary, and in other inner peripheral areas of 
neighboring states. 
The research described here was designed to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
wave of Hungarian immigration that originated in neighboring countries (and their predecessor 
states), starting from the end of the 1980s and continuing to the present day. Since a decrease 
has been observed in this immigration flow recently, research questions have also addressed 
the possible long-term demographic challenges caused by this tendency. Other questions 
concern the effects of this kind of immigration on the demography, society, and economy of 
Hungary.  
 
Current Patterns of CEE Migration and Theories Behind Emigration from CEE 
 
A mass migration of Central and Eastern European labor force towards the European 
core areas is a dominant social feature. This process has already started from the mid-1990s. 
After the EU (European Union) accessions, the previously expected large wave of migration to 
the West did not start everywhere or all at once, but nonetheless tens of thousands of migrants 
left the region each year and the net migration rate in Central and Eastern European countries 
become robustly negative (DeWaard & Raymer, 2012). 
This migration inside the EU was mainly driven by differences in wages, and 
strengthens centre-periphery relations and the dependency of the CEE within the EU (e.g. 
Matzhanova & Simtikov, 2021; Salamin, 2015a, 2015b; Simionescu, 2016; Török, 2017). The 
steady migration of the working-age population from CEE to Western Europe – along with the 
low birth rates and relatively unfavorable mortality rates in the region – lead to significant aging 
and depopulation (Frejka & Gietel-Basten, 2016; Lutz, 2010). These demographic trends may 
significantly impact employment, public services, and the sustainability of the pension system. 
According to Rees et al. (2012), the workforce in Eastern Europe may decline by 30% in 2050.  
As a high proportion of CEE immigrants are well educated, a brain drain occurs in CEE, 
or even a “brain waste” as highly educated CEE immigrants frequently end up in low skilled 
jobs (Kaczmarczyk 2010; Schneider, 2021). (CEE immigrants in the EU have realized a 
generally lower socio-economic status than the native population but better than non-European 
migrants [e.g. Zubíková, 2019]). However, positive effects of this emigration on the CEE 
economies, such as lowering unemployment or stimulating economic growth, can also be 
explored (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2020; Schneider, 2021). Still, significant long-term development 
perspectives and catching up of CEE economies with the Western European core areas probably 
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cannot be realised with high levels of emigration (Grieveson, 2019; Piatkowsky, 2013; 
Smętkowski, 2018).  
The abundant literature on recent emigration from CEE – which is especially rich in the 
context of Polish and Romanian population having the highest emigrant rates – examines not 
only long-term permanent emigration, but other frequently appearing forms, too, e.g.: a return 
to the home country or a circulation (e.g. Croitoru, 2021; Drinkwater & Garapich, 2015; 
Strockmeijer et al., 2019), as well as multiple further migration (Ciobanu, 2015).  
Due to the shortage of labor caused by emigration many CEE countries themselves have 
become target areas of labor force migration since the mid-2010s (Brunarska et al., 2016; 
Jaroszewicz, 2018). The main sources of this new immigration are regions lying east and south 
of the EU. EU Member States of CEE started to compete with each other and Western Europe 
for this labour in the 2010s (first of all for Ukrainian immigrants). As a consequence, CEE 
labour markets became more open and ethnocentric migration enhanced (see later) 
(Jaroszewicz, 2018). In the meanwhile, other policies on immigration have not changed much, 
since in CEE the political and public arguments on immigration (in line with the social attitudes 
towards [non-European] immigrants) are rather mistrustful compared to other parts of the EU 
(among others e.g. Matusz et al., 2020; Peshkopia et al., 2021; Prucova Hruzova, 2021). 
 
A Special Way of Mobility in CEE: Ethnocentric Migration 
 
Besides east-west migration patterns discussed above, another characteristic CEE 
migration process evolved between communities which have similar ethnic backgrounds. This 
type of migration is a traditional feature in this macroregion where ethnic minority communities 
exist in a high density (cf. e.g. the density of minority languages, which is much higher in CEE 
than in Western European countries [Council of Europe, 2015]). During the first stage of post-
socialist migration, from the late 1980s onwards, relocation occurred mainly between CEE 
countries, and mostly on the basis of ethnicity: the national or ethnic minority population moved 
to countries where the same nationality or ethnicity makes up the majority (ethnic and national 
minorities are not differentiated in this study). Examples include German, Turkish, and 
Hungarian minority communities, as well as the ethnic communities of former Yugoslavia and 
the former Soviet Union. We define this type of migration as ethnocentric in this study, 
mentioning the related migrant community as ethnocentric migrants or immigrants. 
Ethnocentric migration provides a geographic frame or a network for migrants with various 
motivations (e.g. seeking for jobs, family reunion or even asylum). 
Coleman (2009) set up a global prognosis on the growing demographic diversity of 
more developed macroregions and the remaining homogeneity of less developed ones. This 
concept can be supported in a European context through ethnocentric migration by taking into 
account the potential significance of ethnocentric migration in a peripheral macroregion (CEE), 
the migration patterns of the more developed Western European core areas, as well as the 
differences between the national migration strategies inside the EU.  
Ethnocentric migration has probably remained a significant process in CEE, still it has 
not become a popular research subject compared to the emigration mentioned above. However, 
there are some studies that touch upon this subject. Ethnocentric migration may be stimulated 
in the region by the strong historical and cultural links between some of the CEE countries. 
This is true of the Czech Republic and Slovakia (e.g. Horáková, 2000), the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia (e.g. Raduaiki, 2016; Valenta et al., 2016), the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, especially in the case of the Russian population (Heleniak, 2001; Molodikova, 2007), 
and Poland and its eastern neighbours (Brunarska & Lesińska, 2014). Geopolitical position may 






the EU can be outstandingly mobile towards their EU member kin-state, e.g. Poles in Belarus 
(Wallace & Patsiurko, 2017) or Hungarians in Ukraine or Serbia (Péti et al., 2018). 
Unlike immigration in general, ethnocentric migration is in many cases encouraged by 
the kin-states’ policies in CEE. For instance, simplifications of policy requirements on visa and 
citizenship in the case of external co-ethnic communities have been introduced (e.g. Hungary, 
Poland, Romania-Moldova). These actions could not result in a more favorable demographic 
situation for the whole ethnic group (Dumbrava, 2018). They enabled emigration from the 
ethnic minority community towards destinations other than the EU member kin-state (e.g. 
Gödri, 2015; Tabac & Gagauz, 2020), and also a short term and circular ethnocentric migration 
of labour (Brunarska et al., 2016).  
Due to the scarcity in direct comprehensive research on CEE ethnocentric migration, 
our knowledge on its patterns and demographic, economic, social, cultural impacts is limited. 
This study aims to contribute to mapping this subject by exploring the Hungarian case, which 
is probably the most substantial in CEE. 
 
Hungary as a Field for Studying Ethnocentric Migration 
 
The situation of ethnic Hungarians may be one of the most emblematic markers of 
ethnocentric migration, as this population makes up large and specific communities. For 
example, in 2011 more than two million ethnic Hungarians were living in seven neighboring 
countries of Hungary, with communities numbering well in excess of 100,000 in four countries 
(Kapitány, 2013). Ethnic Hungarians have a highly distinctive (polarized) identity and language 
that distinguishes them from the majority populations (Kiss, 2014). This is because the 
territorial readjustments of Hungary after the First and the Second World Wars, native 
Hungarian minority communities were left isolated from their homeland. 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Hungary was largely a beneficiary of 
international migration, but from then onwards until the fall of the communist regime in 1989 
the yearly migration balance was mostly negative, and nearly 1,300,000 people left the country. 
This was only offset by Hungarians moving back to Hungary from regions detached from 
Hungary after World War I. From the 1990s onwards, the trends changed, as Hungary became 
a destination country (Kincses, 2015). On the one hand, the opportunity to return opened up for 
Hungarians who had previously emigrated or remained outside the border. On the other hand, 
migration processes within the region strengthened, and Hungary, which was in relatively good 
economic situation, became one of the target countries (Wallace, 2002). An ethnocentric pattern 
also labels this process motivated by better cultural or economic opportunity or (self-)exile. 
Later on, the typical CEE emigration to Western Europe also appeared in Hungary. Even 
though the mass emigration observed among other countries that joined the EU in 2004 initially 
affected Hungary to a lesser extent, almost 400,000 people had left the country by 2010. 
Moreover, in the first part of the 2010s, the annual number of emigrants rose to around 100,000 
(Blaskó & Gödri, 2014). 
Migration and the socio-economic aspects of Hungary’s immigrant population have 
been the subject of a large set of Hungarian studies (most recently e.g. Cseh Papp, et al., 2018; 
Kincses & Tóth, 2019). Still, the ethnocentric immigrant population of the latest decades and 
its potential and quantifiable – supposedly great – impacts have not been studied specifically. 
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Defining the Ethnocentric Immigrant Population in the Case of Hungary 
 
The research is based on the 2011 census data, and the target group is the population 
born in neighboring countries and their predecessor states (see Table 1) who moved to Hungary 
after 1985. 
The research basically focuses on the most recent ethnocentric migration the movement 
of Hungarians2 based on individual decisions, as well as due to very high-impact mass 
migration, which is why we have applied a time constraint to largely filter out internal migration 
that occurred before the border changes and forced demographic movements associated with 
international treaties. Due to our data, migration had started to increase gradually already after 
1985 which reflects the historical background of cause of migration: in Romania hosting the 
most populous ethnic Hungarian community a political persecution of ethnic Hungarians started 
in 1984 as well as the living standards dropped (Bottoni, 2017). 
In addition to the limits posed by the timeframe, we applied a territorial limitation as 
the aim was primarily to study the migration characteristics of Hungarians living in countries 
neighboring Hungary and their predecessors (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Neighboring Countries and Their Predecessors Included in the Study 
Country Predecessor state 
Slovakia Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) 
Ukraine Russia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 









The definition of the immigrant population is based on the 2011 census methodology. 
On 1 October 2011 (at the time of the census), 83% of the population born abroad (318,897 
people) had been born in neighboring countries or their predecessors (Table 2). However, in 
the case of 22% of the examined population, the year of moving to Hungary is unknown: 11% 
of the latter (33,814 people) did not answer this question in the census, and 35,550 people 
answered that they had not lived abroad for at least one year, even though they were born abroad 
(11% of the examined population). In the former case, these individuals were presumably born 
and/or moved during/after the reorganization of the borders, so for them being born abroad did 
not mean living abroad. 
 
 
2 In the present study, the population described as “Hungarian” always refers to those who declare themselves to 
be of Hungarian ethnic background (in the census). 
3 Germany formed a joint state with Austria briefly (1938-45), but the reasons for involving Germany are as 
follows: it is easily accessible from Austria sharing the same language; it is a traditional destination for emigration 







Distribution of Immigrants Born in Neighboring Countries and Their Predecessors According 
to Country of Birth and Year of Immigration 
Place of 
birth 















Romania 176,550 17,595 131,248 15,435 12,272 155,955 
Ukraine 35,354 5,727 20,985 3,086 5,556 28,587 
Slovakia 33,155 14,290 9,321 8,486 1,058 10,641 
Serbia 29,144 4,193 16,926 3,166 4,859 22,125 
Germany 22,605 3,305 10,709 2,023 6,568 18,060 
Russia 6,690 2,043 3,373 703 571 4,225 
Austria 6,160 677 2,630 1,213 1,640 4,695 
Croatia 3,498 1,401 1,140 746 211 1,410 
Czech 
Republic 










748 24 552 32 140 703 





506 68 323 29 86 415 
Kazakhsta
n 
482 60 296 27 99 402 
Moldova 267 11 158 14 84 234 
Latvia 161 34 71 8 48 105 
Lithuania 161 32 96 6 27 117 
Estonia 134 19 73 4 38 108 
Total 318,897 50,286 199,247 35,550 33,814 249,753 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
 
Taking into account only the number of immigrants by year of immigration, the 
population moving to Hungary is 199,247 (Table 2). However, using this criterion 70,000 
people would be excluded from the analysis (as 70,000 people did not answer this question 
during the 2011 census). To avoid this, the year of moving was estimated with the help of 
known dates of immigration based on country of birth and year of birth. We replaced the 
missing values with the median year of migration of persons born in the same country and in 
the same year (assuming that the median year of immigration for immigrants from country X 
and birth cohort Y is not different for those of non-respondents from the country X and birth 
cohort Y). Thus, 99.7% of the missing values were replaced. If no year of migration and/or year 
of birth were given for a country, due to the lack of data those individuals were excluded from 
Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies 
2021, Vol. 8, No. 4, 128-153   
http://dx.doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/857 
                                                           Copyright 2021 
                                                        ISSN: 2149-1291 
 
 134 
the analyses, but this situation applied to only 148 cases. In line with the above-described 
method, a total of 249,753 individuals were successfully included in the analysis (Table 2). 
 
The Methodological Background of Population Projections 
 
The research also covers the effects of the ethnocentric immigrant population on the 
demographic trends of Hungary. In relation to the past, the research question was: “what would 
have happened if the ethnocentric immigrants had not arrived?” In this case, from 1990 
onwards, we projected the population figures by leaving out those arriving from neighboring 
states. 
Another research question was focused on the future: “what will happen if the 
ethnocentric immigration process changes?” The research related to these issues (population 
projections) only dealt with immigration from the four large ethnic Hungarian communities in 
Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Serbia. These were based on the baseline version of the 
population projection made by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute (HDRI) in 2015 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘official population projection’) (Földházi, 2015), which was 
modified on the basis of three hypotheses. The input data were the annual population statistics 
on the number of immigrants, year of birth, sex, and citizenship, as well as the population 
records.  
The population projection was undertaken using the cohort component method, the 
components of which, in addition to population, are births, deaths, and migration balances. 
According to the official population projection, which is also used in the present research, the 
total fertility rate will reach 1.6 by 2021 and last until 2060, with a life expectancy at birth of 
89 years for women, 85 years for men, and a migration balance of a surplus of 7,500 people 
(Földházi, 2015).  
For the population projection, the annual demographic data, annual migration data, 
immigration data from four neighboring countries between 1985 and 2015 and population 
projection data (births, deaths, migration and population) were already known from the official 
population projection. In addition, annual data on migration from neighboring countries 
included in the study were calculated, by age and sex based.  
The proportion of immigrants from the four neighboring countries within the total 
number of immigrants, which was already considered in the official population projection, had 
to be revised. The official population projection did not differentiate immigration by country of 
origin. According to citizenship, between 1990 and 2004 the proportion of immigrants from 
these four countries among the total number of immigrants was around 80%, which then fell 
sharply to less than 50% in 2010. One of the reasons for this was the economic crisis, and the 
other the simplified process of obtaining Hungarian citizenship that was introduced in 2010 
(because of which some immigrants arrived in Hungary as Hungarian citizens) (Dumbrava, 
2018; Gödri, 2015). According to another piece of research, if immigrants with Hungarian 
citizenship are taken into account, we see an increase rather than a decrease during the period 
2011-2013 (Gödri, 2015). Although this calculation is limited to the years between 2011 and 
2013, it proves to be sufficient for an estimate of future trends. With this correction, the 
proportion of Hungarian immigrants was still around 50% even in 2013 (without the correction 
it would have been around 40%). We applied an exponential approach to determine the 
expected migration numbers in the population projections. Results indicate that in the official 
population projection the proportion of immigrants from the four neighboring countries will be 
41.4% in 2040 and 38.8% in 2060. The number of immigrants from 2023 will exceed the 
average of the last 30 years. 
These were the results that we modified in line with the three different hypotheses: two 






situations; the third one calculated an increase in short term followed by a long-term decrease 
caused by the expiring demographic resources of ethnic Hungarian communities (see details 
later). 
 
Results: Demographic and Human Resources of Ethnocentric Immigrants 
 
Main Demographic Characteristics 
 
This population of about 250,000 that have immigrated since the mid-1980s accounts 
for about 78% of all immigrants from neighboring countries and their predecessor states (Figure 
1). (We mention this population in this chapter as ‘ethnocentric immigrants’ or simply just 
immigrants.) Among the larger and predominantly Hungarian immigrant groups, only from the 
former Czechoslovakia did fewer people move to Hungary after 1985 than before. This region 
was affected by serious political crisis involving Hungarians only before 1985, unlike the other 
neighboring regions that have also suffered from economic collapse and even armed conflict 
since the mid-1980s. 
 
Figure 1 
Distribution of Immigrants Born in Neighboring Countries and Their Predecessors by Year of 
Immigration and Country of Birth, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
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There is no significant difference in terms of gender between ethnocentric immigrants 
and the total Hungarian population (Figure 2). Among the larger immigrant groups, those with 
Serbian origins are the exception, with a high proportion of men who were fugitives from the 
forced conscription associated with the Yugoslavian Wars. Members of another relatively large 
immigrant community from Germany and Austria consist mainly of non-native Hungarians and 
include resettling German Hungarians, and former Hungarian emigrants who frequently have 
business motivations (i.e. the acquisition and operation of businesses) (Péti, 2017). Therefore, 
the overrepresentation of men among them is in line with European trends (Strey et al., 2018). 
 
Figure 2 
Distribution of Immigrants Born in Neighboring Countries and Their Predecessors by Gender 
and Country of Birth, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
 
There are significant differences between ethnocentric immigrants and the population 
of Hungary concerning age. Among the immigrant population, the proportion of the active age 
group (15–64 years) is much larger than in the Hungarian population. 
It is also clear that there is a relatively small difference in the proportion of the elderly 
(over 65), so the higher proportion of the active age group is to the ‘detriment’ of the young age 
group of 0-15 (Figure 3). The most aged population is from Austria: German and Austrian 







Immigrant Population Broken Down by Proportions of Young, Active, and Elderly, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
 
Examining the population in more detail using age groups of five years, the largest 
difference can be seen among those aged 40-44, who are represented in proportions of 7% in 
Hungary and almost 13% among ethnocentric immigrants. (Figure 4).  
In other words, the ethnocentric immigrants have not substantially rejuvenated the 
population of Hungary (because the proportion of young people among them is very small), but 
from the point of view of the national economy, the high proportion of people of working age 
represents an extremely important resource.  
 
Figure 4 
Distribution of the Immigrant Population by Age Groups of Five Years, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
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The fertility of ethnocentric immigrant women is lower than the Hungarian average. 
While in Hungary there were 147 live births per 100 women aged 15 and older in 2011, the 
figure was only 130 per 100 immigrant women of the same age. This is presumably related to 
overall international migration patterns, according to which women involved in migration and 
the migrant population are more often forced to postpone or to give up on childbearing (Gödri, 
2010). (This can be contrasted with the situation of women who have emigrated from Hungary 
to Great Britain, for whom higher fertility rate can be observed than of women in Great Britain 
or Hungary [Kapitány & Spéder, 2015]). 
Ethnocentric immigrants also contributed to the population of Hungary with their 
numbers. In 2011, their population of about 250,000 people made up 2.5% of the population of 
Hungary – a proportion much greater than, for example, the population of the largest native 
ethnic minorities in Hungary (German/Swabian, 1.9% in 2011). Including also children born in 
Hungary to women aged 15+ who moved after 1985, the estimated number of immigrants and 
their children is 315,000. This immigration can thus have a great impact on the population of 
Hungary and – concerning its age structure – an even greater one on the labor force (see below). 
 
Mother Tongue and Ethnic Background 
 
Among the ethnocentric immigrant population, 69% declared themselves to be of 
Hungarian nationality or – in other words – to belong to the Hungarian ethnic community (84% 
in the case of total Hungarian population).4 In 13 of the 18 countries (or groups of countries) 
examined, it is primarily people with Hungarian nationality that moved to Hungary, while the 
second most common nationality is the majority nationality of the given country. Only in the 
case of five countries (Germany, Russia and the three Baltic States) is the majority nationality 
dominant among the immigrants; and here Hungarian is ranked in second place. The vast 
majority of the most populous communities from neighboring countries are Hungarians: 80% 
of those arriving from Romania (accounting for nearly half of all ethnocentric immigrants) 
declared themselves to be of Hungarian nationality (and only 3% other than Hungarian); from 
those arriving from Slovakia, Ukraine, and Serbia 66% were of Hungarian nationality (and only 
15%, 6%, and 5%, respectively, were other than Hungarian).  
Sixty-eight percent of the studied population stated that their mother tongue was 
Hungarian. As we move further away from Hungary, the number of people of Hungarian 
nationality significantly decreases, but the proportion of Hungarian speakers decreases less. 
Although it is not known how many of those who declared themselves to be Hungarian in 2011 
underwent a change of national/ethnic identity, it may be assumed that some of those who 
moved to Hungary from more distant countries may be affected by diaspora-specific patterns 
of identity (Bába, 2015) that do not link national identity to mother tongue. 
Knowledge of the Hungarian language (Figure 5) is rather common; and it also plays a 
role in the Hungarian labor market, as it is still a basic requirement in almost all positions today 
(see other human resource-based characteristics in the next section). 
 
 
4 These figures are significantly influenced by non-respondents. The proportion of those whose nationality is other 
than Hungarian is only 2.2% in Hungary, and 7.4% among immigrants. The same situation applies to mother 







Knowledge of Hungarian Language Among Immigrants, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
 
The Added Value of Ethnocentric Immigrants in Terms of Human Resources 
 
Educational attainment fundamentally determines the chances of immigrants in the 
labour market. In line with previous research on overall immigrant population of Hungary (e.g. 
Kincses, 2015), the present research has found that ethnocentric immigrants to Hungary also 
have, on average, a higher level of education than the Hungarian population (Figure 6). The 
proportion of ethnocentric immigrants with a tertiary education from large Hungarian 
communities in the neighboring countries is significantly higher than the 2011 average for 
Hungary and the countries of origin, and notably higher than the 2011 figure for members of 
the Hungarian communities living in the countries of origin.5 This clearly refers to the 
significant drain of the skilled labor force. However, educational positions change rapidly in 
CEE: compared to more recent higher education data, 2011 data on immigrants appears to be 
favorable, but indicates less of an educational advantage.6  
Knowledge of a foreign language is an important labor market advantage and may be a 
factor in making a decision to migrate; it also infers a higher-level education, so deductions can 
be made regarding this factor concerning both the probability of integration and economic 
opportunities. Ethnocentric immigrants generally speak the majority language of a neighboring 
country, unlike members of Hungary’s population, which may be an advantage for some jobs, 
as well as enables immigrants to manage relationships between countries. The knowledge of 
the language of some neighboring countries (i.e. Romanian, Slovakian, etc.) is present in 
Hungary principally because of this immigrant population. 84% percent of all Romanian 
speakers in Hungary are from this immigrant population, as are 83% of Ukrainian-speaking 
people, but the proportion also exceeds 20% for all other languages. 
 
5 The proportion of people with a tertiary education in 2011: Slovakia: 20%, Serbia: 17%, Romania: 14% (Ukraine: 
12% in 2001); Hungarians of Slovakia: 13%, Hungarians of Serbia: 10%, Hungarians of Romania: 10%, 
Hungarians of Ukraine: 5% (2001) (data source: national statistical offices, census data sorted by ethnic variable). 
6 Proportion of people with a tertiary education in 2018: Hungary: 23%, Slovakia: 23%, Serbia: 22%,; Romania: 
15% (Ukraine: no data); Hungarians of Slovakia: 15%, Hungarians of Serbia: 13%, Hungarians of Romania: 16%, 
Hungarians of Ukraine: 13% (Péti et al., 2021). 
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The ethnocentric immigrant community is also more advanced in terms of the 
knowledge of global languages (Figure 7), which may be primarily related to the higher 
education level (and perhaps also to more effective education outside Hungary).  
 
Figure 6 
Distribution of Population Aged 25 and Over by Education, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
 
Figure 7 
Foreign-Language Skills of the Immigrant Population, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
 
Unlike in Western Europe, immigrants in Hungary and in CEE are not at a disadvantage 
compared to the host population (Gödri, 2010). Our post 1985 ethnocentric immigrants have 
similar features:  
 
• The employed are overrepresented in age group 15-64 (Figure 8). In addition to the 
identical linguistic and cultural background, favorable age structure and closely related 
economic activity may play a major role. 
• The employment rates for various sectors do not differ significantly between the 






administration, where the proportion of immigrants is only 5% (Hungarian: 9%). 
Immigrants’ training and work experience outside Hungary may be less adaptable to the 
Hungarian administrative work environment, or well-educated immigrants may earn 
more outside the public sector.  
• The occupational structure of the age group 15–64 is similar among the Hungarian 
resident population and ethnocentric immigrants in the case of both genders. Most of 
the employed population in Hungary aged 15–64 work in occupations requiring a 
tertiary or secondary education (17%), while immigrants (21%) are more likely to have 
occupations requiring a tertiary education. Moreover, occupations requiring higher-
level qualifications are more common among immigrants.  
 
However, in the case of this indicator, the over-representation of immigrants is perhaps 
more moderate than in the case of education. This may also indicate that some immigrants are 
unable to utilize their higher education qualifications in the Hungarian labor market, which may 
be related to the recognition of qualifications or migration motivations and life strategies (they 
may be more inclined to choose to run a business rather than becoming an employees). 
However, immigrants are not lagging in this field, because 60.3% of those with a university or 
college degree work in jobs requiring tertiary education, which is almost 4% higher than the 
total figure in Hungary. 
 
Figure 8 
Distribution of Population Aged 15 and Over by Economic Activity, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & 
RINS. 
 
A separate analysis focused on some occupations requiring higher education, most of 
which are shortage professions.  
 
• Ethnocentric immigrants were over-represented in all nine shortage professions 
involved in the study (physician, dentist, veterinary surgeon, engineer, IT specialist, 
teacher, lawyer, and other secondary and tertiary workers), which are important for the 
national economy and social well-being. This is not at all surprising given their 
qualification structure. However, for some professions, the degree of overrepresentation 
is almost staggering (e.g. dentist, doctors) (Figure 9).  
Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies 
2021, Vol. 8, No. 4, 128-153   
http://dx.doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/857 
                                                           Copyright 2021 
                                                        ISSN: 2149-1291 
 
 142 
• The prevalence of these selected occupations is also shown (Figure 10). The share of 
immigrants is greater for each examined profession (especially among physicians). This 
situation represents a serious loss for the communities of origin. 
• Ethnocentric immigrants arriving after the age of 21 in these selected occupations were 
specifically examined as they are most likely to earn qualifications before migration, 
indicating not only additional human resources but also significant savings on human 
resource investment for Hungary. The proportion of those who obtained their degrees 
after immigration varies between 40% (lawyers and IT specialists) and 6.7% 
(veterinarians). It also worth mentioning that the engineers, physicians, and IT 
specialists are among the top professions in Hungary that struggle with a labor shortage. 
 
Figure 9 
The Proportion of Immigrant Population in Certain Professions, % 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian population census data 2011. Copyright 2021 by HCSO & RINS. 
 
Figure 10 
Population per Thousand Persons in Some Selected Occupations, Persons 
 






Changes in Native Hungarian Communities Abroad 
 
Examining the emitting regions of immigration – the ethnic Hungarian minority 
communities – has not been covered in the present research, but other studies have already 
addressed this topic. The significant quantitative (demographic) and even more significant 
qualitative (human-resource-related) added value in Hungary due to migration of these 
populations has obviously caused extremely severe losses for these communities abroad (e.g. 
Kapitány, 2013). The significant aging experienced in almost all ethnic Hungarian communities 
in neighboring countries can be attributed to this.  
This may be one of the reasons why the intensity of this ethnocentric immigration is 
probably not sustainable, and its continuation may lead to more significant losses at an 
increasing speed. According to the present research, the large-scale loss of trained people – i.e., 
intense ‘brain drain’ – can also be reasonably assumed. This might be challenging for 
Hungary’s kin-state politics on maintaining native Hungarian minority communities abroad 
(Kántor, 2014). 
 
The Impact of Ethnocentric Immigration Through Population Projections 
 
After describing the characteristics of the immigrant population, questions arose about 
its quantifiable effects on the population of Hungary as experienced in the past, and its future 
potential. Therefore, population projections were made in the frame of this research. Three 
hypotheses/research questions were formulated for the future:  
 
• What will the population of Hungary be by 2060 if fewer people immigrate in frame of 
ethnocentric migration (see in this case: immigration from neighboring countries of 
Hungary with more than 100,000 ethnic Hungarians: Serbia, Romania, Ukraine and 
Slovakia) than assumed in the official population projection made in 2015?;  
• What will the population of Hungary be by 2060 if only the number of people who 
immigrate from Ukraine increases, compared to the official population projection (due 
to probable but hypothetical political and economic crises)?;  
• What will the population of Hungary be by 2060 if more ethnocentric immigrants arrive 
(from four countries see above) than assumed in the official population projection?  
 
The development of these three future scenarios was based on a consensus that emerged 
among professional demographers and decision-makers. Naturally, these findings can only be 
considered hypotheses as they have been scarcely explored empirically – and if so, mostly only 
through case studies. The hypothetical processes reflected in these scenarios are based on 
relatively new phenomena that had not emerged at the time of the 2011 census. Investigating 
these new features will probably be challenging even after 2011 or through a new census 
because of data collection and public-administration-related concerns. Due to the increasingly 
widespread phenomenon of dual citizenship among minority ethnic Hungarian groups, censuses 
will not necessarily be able to fully inform us about these phenomena. The intensive uptake of 
dual citizenship in 2010 also makes it difficult to identify real geographical mobility processes 
through register data. 
One of the most important consensual observations is that the wave of ethnocentric 
immigration from neighboring countries to Hungary slowed down in the 2010s. The emissive 
capacity of ethnic Hungarian communities decreased significantly even since 2011 (Kapitány, 
2013). Migration destinations in Western Europe are becoming more and more attractive for 
ethnic Hungarians (Papp, 2017), and their dual citizenship provides a better access to the 
Western European labour market (Gödri, 2015; Péti et al., 2018).  
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Social, economic, and political reasons for immigration may also significantly change 
the development of scenarios. Most ethnocentric immigrants came from Romania during the 
time of persecution and economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, or from Yugoslavia during the 
civil wars of 1990s. The impact of new economic and lifestyle opportunities can also be 
observed: cross-border employment and commuting or urban development (agglomeration) 
may have contributed to the rise of immigration to areas adjacent to Romania and Slovakia 
since the 2000s (Péti et al., 2018). At present, however, it is worthwhile considering scenarios 
that will bring about significant change, especially in the case of Ukraine. This state, due to 
geopolitical reasons is generally unstable, and presents a risk of mass emigration (Legucka et 
al., 2021). Besides deep overall Ukrainian political and economic crisis compounded by armed 
conflict, political tensions between the government and the ethnic Hungarian community have 
also emerged recently. Data supply from this region is poor because the 2011 census was 
cancelled, although a Hungarian study partially remedied this (Tátrai et al., 2018). However, 
based on the available data and consensus experience, significant permanent or temporary 
outflow is likely, in which not only Hungarian immigrants will participate in large numbers. 
Scenarios along hypothesizes: 
 
1. According to the first hypothesis, the number of ethnocentric immigrants from 
neighboring countries will decrease compared to the previous period – namely the 
immigration of young people (under 15 years old) and working age people (15-64 years 
old) from neighboring countries will decrease in 2017 to 75% of the average of the last 
30 years (1985-2015), later to 50% (in 2018), to 25% (in 2019), and to 10% in 2020; 
and will remain at the latter level from 2021 to 2060. The change in the proportion of 
elderly immigrants (over 65 years old) follows that of young and working age people 
with a five-year lag. Compared to the other two hypotheses and the official population 
projection, this also results in the most unfavorable demographic situation. According 
to this, the proportion and number of young and active people is lowest in this scenario, 
and that of the elderly is the highest. The country’s population will decrease to seven 
million by 2060. The proportion of young people will decrease from 14.5% to 13.3% 
compared to 2016; the proportion of the active age population will fall from 67% to 
51.6%; while the proportion of the elderly will increase from 18.5% to 35%. While 
according to the official population projection, the population will be 7.9 million by 
2060, the proportion of people under 15 will be 13%, the working age population is 
projected to be 54.1%, while the proportion of elderly is expected to be 33% (Földházi, 
2015). There will be a more even distribution of genders and age groups, with a larger 
number of older age groups and a slight increase in the number of people moving 
towards old age. In addition, we can expect a slight surplus in the number of women 
and also the elderly, to an increasing extent. These latter trends are similar in the 
following other two scenarios too, with only minor changes in the number of migrants 
that are expected. 
2. The starting point of the second hypothesis is that only the number of immigrants from 
Ukraine will increase compared to the previous situation (not exclusively ethnocentric 
migrants). According to this scenario, the number of arrivals from Ukraine will increase 
significantly by 2026 (in total, 290,000 people will arrive in Hungary), and after 2026 
migration trends will follow the official population projection. This scenario results in 
a more moderately aging population, and the country’s total population will remain 
above eight million by 2060. A rise of two percentage points will be seen for the active 







3. The third hypothesis is that more ethnic Hungarian people from neighboring countries 
will immigrate compared to the official population projection. According to this 
scenario, the immigration of young people (under 15 years of age) and people of 
working age (15-64 years old) from the four countries together will increase in 2017 to 
110% of the average of the last 30 years (1985-2015); later to 120% (in 2018), 130% 
(in 2019), and 150% in 2020; remain at the latter level from 2021 to 2030; and from 
then on will fall steadily back to the average level of the last 30 years in five years’ 
time (in line with the probable disappearance of the ability of ethnic Hungarian minority 
communities to emit emigrants) and remain so until 2060. Older immigrants (65+) 
follow young and working age people with a lag of five years, but the proportions and 
trends are the same for them. If this hypothesis is realized, the total population of 
Hungary would be 7.67 million in 2060, thus the scenario leads to a lower population 
than the official population projection, despite the initial increase in immigration. This 
is mainly because the official population projection assumes a gradually increasing 
positive migration balance from 2035 (not calculating with ethnocentric migrants, but 
others), as opposed to our hypothesis. However, the results of this third hypothesis 
come closest to the official population projection both in terms of population and 
number of births and deaths (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 
Baseline Model of the Official Population Projections of the HDRI and Three Versions of the 
Hypothetical Forecast, Persons 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian official population projection data 2015. Copyright 2021 by HDRI 
& RINS. 
 
The question also arises: how would Hungary's population have changed if no 
ethnocentric immigration had taken place since the 1980s. If those who had immigrated from 
neighboring countries were not included in the population, the population would have decreased 
by an average of 33,500 people per year between 1990 and 2011, and by 56,000 between 2011 
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and 2015. Thus, the population would have fallen below 10 million as early as in 2003 (Figure 
12). In actual fact this happened only by 2011. 
 
Figure 12 
Population Trends in Reality and Without the Immigration from the Four Neighboring 
Countries, Persons 
 
Note. Source: Hungarian official population projection data 2015. Copyright 2021 by HDRI 
& RINS. 
 
Conclusions and Discussions 
 
Ethnocentric migration takes place between communities sharing the same ethnic 
background. Cultural relations or similar identity patterns can stimulate this process. It has 
become an emblematic type of migration in CEE since the 1980s between ethnic minority 
communities and kin-states driven by various motivations (e.g. work, family, avoiding 
repression). Still, it has been studied less intensively than the other emblematic migration 
process of CEE: the emigration to Western Europe. This study maps ethnocentric migration in 
Hungary which is probably one of the most significant ethnocentric type of migration processes 
in CEE. 
According to our definition, ethnocentric migration in Hungary takes place when ethnic 
Hungarians living outside of Hungary move to Hungary. This definition was applied on the 
dataset of the 2011 Hungarian census. Due to the former changes of the Hungarian state border, 
ethnic Hungarians who were born outside of Hungary and have moved to Hungary since 1985 
were involved in our analysis (patterns of former internal migration have to be excluded). 1985 
is also a starting point of mass migration to Hungary from the co-ethnic minority communities 
triggered by political and economic crises.  
This study searched for the main quantitative demographic parameters of the 
community of ethnocentric migrants in Hungary. Another research question of this study is how 
the demography of Hungary would change if there were a change in this wave of immigration. 







• This ethnocentric immigration involves a community of about 250,000 people. Together 
with their descendants who have already been born in Hungary, is estimated at around 
315,000 people.  
• According to a reverse population projection, it is due to ethnocentric immigrants that 
the population of Hungary dropped below 10 million only in 2011; otherwise, this would 
have happened in 2003.  
• If the intensity of immigration decreases – which is a realistic assumption due to the 
other accessible European destinations being more attractive than Hungary and the 
expiring demographic resources of the ageing minority communities – it may affect the 
population of Hungary highly unfavorably. Compared to a baseline scenario involving 
the population projection of Hungary from 2015 and taking into account a sharp 
decrease in ethnocentric immigration, it may lead to a decline in the population of up to 
700,000 by 2060.  
 
Potentials of ethnocentric migrants in influencing social and economic processes of 
Hungary were also investigated through the community’s human resource parameters. This 
migrant population contributed probably even more to the quality parameters of the country's 
human resources than to its quantitative characteristics: 
 
• The economic activity and education of this population are rather higher than that of the 
total Hungarian population.  
• Furthermore, knowledge of foreign languages is more common among this group. With 
a little exaggeration, the speakers of the official languages of neighboring countries are 
almost all members of this community.  
• Important intellectual fields (e.g., health, pedagogy, technical, and IT fields) are highly 
over-represented to such an extent that certain Hungarian professions are considerably 
populated by members of this community.  
 
The Hungarian community of ethnocentric immigrants is generally similar to other 
immigration communities in CEE and differs from Western European ones. The social status 
of this population is high, and it cannot be characterised by problems related to economic 
integration. The added value of this population in Hungary is critical: the country needs 
immigrants, both demographically and in terms of human wealth.  
The Hungarian case discussed in the study might be one of the most significant ones in 
CEE, still is only one case among the potentially many other ethnocentric migration flows of 
CEE. However, this current study may prove the importance and relevance of doing more 
research on ethnocentric migration patterns in CEE. Emigration to Western Europe is not the 
sole concern in describing demographic processes of this macroregion, and the emerging 
migration between CEE countries is highly influenced by ethnocentric features. The future 
significance of this issue can be estimated also from a migration policy point of view. Unlike 
in Western Europe, national policies in CEE rather discourage immigration, but ethnocentric 
ways are encouraged in many CEE countries. This policy approach is relevant not only in the 
context of CEE or Europe, but also on a global level, especially in the case of geopolitical 
hotspots. Therefore, there is a need for further comprehensive studies on ethnocentric migration 
to understand and predict CEE and global migration processes. 
The importance of ethnocentric migration in CEE can be underlined by the fact that 
large ethnic minority communities still exist in this macroregion: besides Hungarians among 
many others e.g. Russians, Poles, Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Romanians and Moldavians sharing 
Romanian identity patterns, Bulgarians and Macedonians, and even Germans. Under the current 
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geopolitical circumstances, relations between these communities sharing similar identity 
patterns can be seriously affected by security and economic crises (which can also be related to 
the pandemic) or emerging policies on identity forming. Intentions to leave minority 
communities and move to kin-states can emerge unexpectedly.  
It is also worth discussing that an overheated Ethnocentric migration can harm the 
demographic structure of the emitting ethnic communities. It has already happened sometimes 
in the past (e.g. most native Germans communities of CEE faded away), but can be assumed in 
the Hungarian case as well. So ethnocentric migration can challenge kin-states’ policies on 
maintaining the already heavily endangered native co-ethnic communities abroad. On the other 
hand, vanishing native minority communities should be considered as a cultural loss not only 
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